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NOTES
RESERVATIONS: THE SURPLUS LANDS ACTS AND
THE QUESTION OF RESERVATION
DISESTABLISHMENT
Susan D. Campbell*
The meaning of the surplus lands acts is now crucial to the integ-
rity of a number of western Indian reservations. Enacted over a
span of almost thirty years after the passage of the Dawes Act of
1887,' these statutes provided for the allotment in severalty of
tracts of land on specific reservations to individual tribal
members, and then for the opening of the surplus lands to settle-
ment. In recent years, the construction of the surplus lands acts
has been the focus of litigation between the Indian tribes and
state and local governments concerning the extent of tribal and
federal jurisdiction over the opened parts of the reservations.3
The discovery of valuable minerals on the opened reservations
and the prospects of taxing their severance have no doubt added
impetus to efforts to resolve the status of the opened lands. Fur-
thermore, the question of criminal jurisdiction over tribal
members who have committed crimes in the opened areas has
been a continuing source of tension between the tribes and state
law enforcement officials. For the tribes and the state and local
governments, much is at stake in the surplus lands cases.
A significant development in the legal contest over the meaning
of the surplus lands acts came in early 1984 with the Supreme
Court's decision in Solem v. Bartlett.4 In Solem, the Court con-
sidered whether an attempted rape committed by John Bartlett, a
member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, occurred within the
boundaries of the Cheyenne River Reservation in South Dakota.
Bartlett had been convicted in state court and sentenced to ten
years in the state penitentiary. He sought a writ of habeas corpus
* Harvard University; First place winner, 1984 Indian Law Writing Competition.
1. 24 Stat. 390 (1887).
2. See, e.g., Act of May 29, 1908, 35 Stat. 460; Act of Aug. 15, 1894, 28 Stat.
337-38; Act of May 27, 1902, 32 Stat. 245, 263; Act of Apr. 23, 1904, 33 Stat. 254.
3. See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, Nos. 81-1827 & 81-1901, slip op. at 3 (10th Cir.
Aug. 29, 1983); Bartlett v. Solem, 691 F.2d 420, 420-21 (8th Cir. 1982). See also Rosebud
Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 585 (1977).
4. 104 S. Ct. 1161 (1984).
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in the federal courts on the grounds that although the crime oc-
curred on the part of the reservation opened under the surplus
lands act of May 29, 1908, this was still within the boundaries of
the reservation and not subject to state jurisdiction.'
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the
language and history of the 1908 Act did not indicate that Con-
gress intended that the 1.6 million acres opened to white
property-ownership should lose reservation status.' Bartlett's
crime, therefore, occurred within the reservation boundaries, and
he should have been tried in federal court. The result of this case,
and the standard of construction used to reach the result, are of
great importance to tribes and to state and local governments
concerned with the extent of the Indian reservations.
This paper will focus on the problems of statutory construction
in the surplus lands cases. The first section will analyze and
criticize the standard of construction used in Solem v. Bartlett
and four other leading surplus lands cases. The object of this
critique is to expose inherent tensions in the standard and to ex-
plain complexities in the doctrine that have resulted when it has
been applied to the surplus lands acts. Second, the paper will re-
ap-praise the application of the standard to the statutory language
and the history of the surplus lands acts. The object of this sec-
tion is to suggest how different results in interpretation of some
of the surplus lands acts might arise, giving the doctrine a dif-
ferent and, it is hoped, more rational content. Finally, the paper
will present an alternate, and more radical, critique of present in-
terpretations of the surplus lands acts. It will inquire into the pro-
priety of using statutory contruction at all, in light of the evolu-
tion of society's values and congressional Indian policy and in
light also of developments in other areas of law.
I. The Standard for Construction
The standard for construction now used in interpreting statutes
affecting Indians is that congressional intent should be deter-
mined by looking at "the face of the Act," "the surrounding cir-
cumstances," and "the legislative history." ' 7 Moreover, the
courts have developed special principles of construction for
statutes affecting Indians. These can be summarized in the rule
5. Id. at 1163.
6. Id. at 1171-72.




that "the legislation of Congress is to be construed in the interest
of the Indian." 8 In surplus lands cases the corollary of this rule is
that Congress must clearly express an "intent to change boun-
daries" before a reservation can be found to be "diminished." 9
The courts must consider a number of factors, then, in inter-
preting statutes affecting Indian lands. These include the
statutory language, the legislative history, and the circumstances
that gave rise to the statute, as well as the judicial policy that in
cases of vague statutes the Indian tribes should be given the
benefit of the doubt. At various points in United States legal
history, one or the other of these factors has been given greater
weight.
Before 1900, when the Supreme Court discussed the construc-
tion of statutes affecting Indians, the language of statutes was all-
important. In Exparte Crow Dog,'° for example, a case involving
the criminal jurisdiction of the United States over Indians, the
Court stated that implied repeals were not favored, and that
general and inconclusive words could not repeal express words of
the previous law." I
In Leavenworth, Lawrence Railroad v. United States, 2 the
Court also stressed the need for specificity in legislation that
would deprive Indians of their rights, especially rights in land. In
that case, the Court was asked to construe federal legislation that
generally granted public lands to encourage railroad construction.
A railroad company had built across an Indian reservation in
Kansas, and then had tried to claim reservation land as grants.
The Court denied this claim on the ground that the reservation
lands, previously reserved by treaty, were not expressly granted in
the railroad land grant legislation. The Court said:
As the act does not mention it, there is no reason to suppose
that Congress, in making the grant, contemplated the extinc-
tion of the Indian tribe at all. . . . The language used is to be
taken as expressing the legislative intention, and the large in-
fluence attempted to be drawn from it is not authorized.' 3
8. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 290 (1909).
9. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 615.
10. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
11. Id. at 570.
12. 92 U.S. 733 (1875).
13. Id. at 744-45.
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The Court also said:
Treaties, like statutes, must rest on the words used, nothing add-
ed thereto, nothing diminishing. In Rex v. Barrell [citation
omitted], Patterson, J., said, "I see the necessity of not im-
porting into statutes words which are not found there. Such a
mode of interpretation only gives occasion to endless
difficulty." Courts have always treated the subject in the same
way, when asked to supply words in order to give a statute a
particular meaning which it would not bear without them.' 4
At this stage in the development of the standard of construction
(which was, interestingly, the time when many of the surplus
lands acts were passed), the courts combined formalistic statutory
analysis, inherited from English practice, with a moral concern
for the Indians. The result was an odd brand of positivism or
strict construction that sought to protect the Indians: changes in
Indian rights had to be expressed specifically in statutes or
treaties, the legislative history notwithstanding.
At the same time that courts had little use for history in inter-
preting statutes, Congress also had little interest in compiling
voluminous legislative histories. Before 1900 committee reports
were generally sparse and inconclusive and only a few were re-
tained.' 5 Members of Congress did not usually read into the
record long statements on particular bills, nor did they con-
sciously "make" the legislative history, as is now the practice.
How, then, did American courts arrive at the present standard
of construction, which relies heavily on inquiries into the history
of an act? While it is not within the scope of this paper to do a
detailed study of the history of statutory construction, a few sug-
gestions as to why this evolution occurred will be made. The shift
in techniques of statutory construction appears to have come
about at the same time as, and possibly as a result of, an intellec-
tual movement called by some "the revolt against formalism."'
6
This movement, which gained momentum in the late 1800s, was
associated with Oliver Wendell Holmes and his book The Com-
mon Law. Stressing substance over form and relying upon
historical studies to get at meaning, Holmes and other jurists con-
14. Id. at 751.
15. See infra note 113 and text accompanying notes 129-130.




sciously shifted away from the English method of interpreting
statutes, which relied upon strict wording. As Holmes com-
plained, courts too often said, "we see what you are driving at,
but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as
before." 7 Rather than disciplining legislatures for failing to ex-
press their intent clearly, American jurists went to great lengths
to divine intent from the general history of events to which an act
was addressed. A new standard of construction evolved, stressing
this historical approach, although not discarding entirely the
older strict analysis of statutory language."'
Perhaps in partial response to this development in the courts,
Congress in the early 1900s began making more detailed
legislative histories. Yet, during this period of transition, statutes
like the surplus lands acts still had little or no legislative history.
Applying the modern standard of construction, which emphasizes
legislative history, to these acts is often fruitless or must involve
considerable speculation. Historical analysis is made even more
difficult by the lack of studies giving specific evidence of the
"surrounding circumstances" of particular statutes.
A further problem is the frequent tension between analyses of
language and history. In any particular case, a court must pro-
duce a single result. That is difficult when the language and
history of a statute conflict, or when either is inconclusive. And,
in cases where a court must analyze a series of similar statutes
that have sparse historical records and vague language, the court
may be tempted to compromise the history or the language of
certain acts. Out of this endeavor, a contorted body of doctrine
can arise. It is submitted that this has happened in the construc-
tion of the surplus lands acts and is one reason that the present
case law, discussed below, is now so confused.
17. Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908).
18. A note in the Harvard Law Review in 1937 observed a "constantly increasing
reliance by American courts on legislative materials in the construction of statutes," and
attributed this to the sense that the legislature is the "controlling instrument for the ex-
pression by means of statutes, of the popular will in the determination of legal relation-
ships." Note, Legislative Materials to Aid Statutory Interpretation, 50 HARV. L. REV. 822
(1937). By the 1930s, the courts' strong approval of the use of committee reports led to
the recognition of their "free employability." Id. at 826. The movement toward use of
legislative history was justified as a response to "strong judges," see Landis, A Note on
"Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 890 (1930), who used the plain mean-
ing of statutes to cloak "judicial legislation." See Miller, The Value of Legislative
History of Federal Statutes, 73 U. PA. L. REv. 158, 170 (1925).
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Before analyzing that case law, however, one other case
touching on the problem of finding congressional intent in
statutes affecting Indians should be mentioned. In the 1975 case,
Bryan v. Itasca County,'9 the Court found congressional intent
by comparing the language of different statutes. The Court in-
dicated that in construing a vague statute, it will consider the ex-
istence and language of other statutes. Where such other statutes
more clearly express a particular meaning, the Court will be hesi-
tant to ascribe that meaning to the vague statute. This com-
parative analysis rests on the assumption that Congress possesses
the ability to express a particular meaning clearly if it has done so
in another statute; thus if Congress intended the same construc-
tion to be given to the statute in question, it would not have
worded the statute so vaguely. There are problems, of course,
with this analysis, not the least being that it implies that Congress
czanot express itself in different ways. Still, as will be shown
below, this approach can be used to form a convincing
positivistic argument about the wording of the surplus land laws.
Current Judicial Interpretations of the Language
and History of the Surplus Lands Acts
The current framework of discussion of surplus lands acts has
been set by four United States Supreme Court cases, Seymour v.
Superintendent,20 Mattz v. Arnett,2 DeCoteau v. District County
Court,22 and Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip.23 These cases have
applied the modem standard of construction and have established
categories of statutory language into which lower courts now try
to fit (however awkwardly) surplus lands statutes at issue before
them. They have also produced two interpretations of the history
of the allotment policy as applied to the surplus lands acts.
Seymour v. Superintendent grew out of a burglary allegedly
committed by a member of the Colville Indian Tribe in the
southern half of the Colville Indian Reservation in the state of
Washington. 24 The accused petitioned for a writ of habeas cor-
pus. He claimed that the "purported crime" was committed in
19. 426 U.S. 373 (1975).
20. 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
21. 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
22. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
23. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
24. 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
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"Indian country"25 and was within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States.26 The Washington Supreme Court denied his
petition on the grounds that the southern half of the Colville Re-
servation was no longer an Indian reservation and so not within
Indian country.
27
On writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the
issue was the current status of the Colville Indian Reservation.
The Court held that the southern half, where the crime took
place, was still an Indian reservation and therefore still Indian
country.28
The Court found that neither a 1906 act of Congress nor a
1916 presidential proclamation did away with the original reserva-
tion boundaries. Rather, as the Court found, they "did no more
than open the way for non-Indian settlers to own land on the re-
servation in a manner which the Federal Government, acting as
guardian and trustee for the Indians, regarded as beneficial to the
development of its wards. "29
Since the Court based its decision in large part on the language
of the act and the proclamation, it is worthwhile to look at that
language in some detail. The 1906 act was entitled "An Act to
authorize the sale and disposition of surplus or unallotted lands
of the diminished Colville Indian Reservation, in the State of
Washington, and for other purposes." 3 It provided "[t]hat the
Secretary of the Interior be, and he is hereby, authorized and
directed, as hereinafter provided, to sell or dispose of unallotted
lands in the diminished Colville Indian Reservation." 3' The act
then provided that the lands should be surveyed and allotted to
tribal Indians, and that on approval of the Interior Secretary,
patents would issue under the general allotment law of the United
States. On completion of the allotment process, the surplus lands
would be classified, appraised, and then opened to settlement
under federal land and mineral laws. Finally, the proceeds of the
25. In 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (1964), "Indian country" is
defined as "(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction
of the United States government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent. . ....
26. The Major Crimes Act gives the United States exclusive jurisdiction over certain
crimes committed within Indian country. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (1964); 18 U.S.C. §
1153 (1982).
27. Seymour v. Schneckloth, 55 Wash. 2d 109, 346 P.2d 669 (1959).
28. Seynmour, 368 U.S. at 357.
29. Id. at 356.
30. 34 Stat. 80.
31. Id. § 1.
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sale of surplus lands were to be deposited in the United States
Treasury to the credit of the Colville Indians and were to be ex-
pended for their benefit.
3 2
The Act of 1906 was a classic surplus lands act: it provided for
allotment, then sale and settlement, of the unallotted lands, with
the federal government standing in as real estate agent, surveyor,
and trustee of the sale proceeds. The proclamation of 1916 was
similar in structure and language. It provided that all
non-mineral, unallotted and unreserved lands within the
diminished Colville Indian Reservation . . . classified as ir-
rigable lands, grazing lands or arid lands, shall be disposed of
under the general provisions of the homestead laws of the
United States and of the said Act of Congress [the 1906 Act],
and shall be opened to settlement and entry and settled upon,
occupied, and entered only in the manner herein described .... 33
The Court found that this language only opened part of the re-
servation to white settlement, but did not change the reservation
boundaries.
3 4
The Court buttressed its construction of the 1906 act and the
1916 proclamation by distinguishing them from another statute,
the Act of 1892,11 which "vacated and restored" the northern
half of the Colville Reservation (the status of which was not in
issue) "to the public domain." 36 Although the Washington
Supreme Court found this act to have the same effect as the 1906
act and the 1916 proclamation,37 the United States Supreme
Court found that it did not. The northern half of the reservation,
the Court said, was dissolved and subjected by the 1892 act to
state law.
31
By making this distinction, the Court created, by implication
and in dicta, a second category of surplus lands statutes: those
that were structured and worded almost identically to the Act of
1906, but which mentioned that the surplus lands were to be
"vacated and restored to the public domain." (It was unclear
whether the Court found the language of vacation, or restoration
32. Id. §§ 3-6.
33. 39 Stat. 1778.
34. Seymour, 368 U.S. at 356-57.
35. 27 Stat. 62, 63.
36. 368 U.S. at 354-55.
37. Seymour v. Schneckloth, 55 Wash. 2d 109, 346 P.2d 669 (1959).




to the public domain, or both, to be determinative.) The Court
considered this language to be charged with meaning, reflecting
Congress' intent that vast tracts of land should be subject to state
law.
The Seymour Court thus found that the policy of certain
surplus lands acts was to open reservation land to settlement so as
to benefit the Indians. It further found that this policy and the
language opening surplus lands to settlement did not require an
end to reservation boundaries. The Seymour Court, however,
created in dicta a category of statutory language that might end a
reservation.
Mattz v. Arnett concerned the question of whether the Act of
June 17, 1892 terminated the Klamath River Indian Reservation. 9
The act was similar to the one at issue in Seymour. It provided for
the sale and settlement of unallotted Klamath Reservation lands
pursuant to the United States homestead, mineral, stone, and
timber acts.4" The proceeds of sale were to go to a fund managed by
the Interior Secretary and used for education of Indians on the
Klamath Reservation. 4'
The Court concluded that the 1892 act did not terminate the
reservation. It examined closely the history of the Klamath Res-
ervation and the legislative history of the 1892 act. It concluded
that the 1892 act was an express disavowal of "efforts to ter-
minate the reservation by denying allotments to the Indians .... "
42
The Court referred to a series of unsuccessful bills that had pro-
vided for express abolition of the reservation, removal of the In-
dians, and opening of the entire tract to settlement. As the Court
noted, "The presence of allotment provisions in the 1892 Act
cannot be interpreted to mean that the reservation was to be ter-
minated. . . .Congress was fully aware of the means by which
termination could be effected. ' 43 The Court noted that the mean-
ing of the allotment provisions of the 1892 act should instead be
ascertained from an overview of the earlier Allotment Act of 1887
(the Dawes Act). 4 The Court observed that the policy of that act
was "to continue the reservation system and the trust status of
Indian lands, but to allot tracts to individual Indians for
39. 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
40. 27 Stat. 52.
41. Id.
42. 412 U.S. 481, at 504.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 496.
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agriculture and grazing. When all the lands had been allotted and
the trust expired, the reservation could be abolished." 45
In Mattz, then, the Court developed a historical approach to
the surplus lands acts. It found that those acts must be inter-
preted in light of the Dawes Act allotment policy, which did not
contemplate an end to the reservation system. In addition, the
Court found the language of the 1896 act to provide for allot-
ment, sale, and settlement, not for dissolution of the reservation.
The Court distinguished acts that contained "clear language of
express termination." 4 The gist of Mattz was that something
more than language providing for allotment and opening of the
lands to settlement was required to eliminate an Indian reserva-
tion and wholly transform the legal status of its people.
In Mattz, and again in dicta, the Court expanded the category
of language that terminated reservations. Now the category con-
tained statutes that "vacated and restored to the public domain,"
that "discontinued" reservations, and that abolished reservation
lines. Any reservation affected by a surplus land statute with such
language was "suspect." Note that the Court at this point had
created the potential for conflict between the history and the
language of these statutes. It developed the idea that the allot-
ment policy of the Dawes Act generally motivated the surplus
lands acts, and yet it found that certain words in those statutes
might wholly negate that policy.
In DeCoteau v. District County Court,'47 the Court found
another surplus lands act, the Act of March 3, 1891,1' to end the
reservation status of the unallotted lands of Lake Traverse Reser-
vation in South Dakota. The Court recognized that the act
should be interpreted against the background of the Dawes Act.
Yet, the Court found that the language of the 1891 act ac-
complished much more than the allotment and settlement envi-
sioned in the Dawes Act.
The Court found the difference to be that the 1891 act con-
tained language of consent. Neither of the statutes discussed in
Seymour and Mattz had such language; both were unilateral acts
of Congress. Yet, in DeCoteau, the Court seized on the apparent
acquiescence of the tribe (however that may have been gained) in
45. Id.
46. Id. at 504 n.22.
47. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).




the sale of the surplus lands. The Act of 1891 ratified an agree-
ment by the Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians to sell their lands for
a sum certain. Interestingly, the accounts of the negotiations
mentioned by the Court show that the Indians agreed to sell the
lands only on the condition that they would be paid the "loyal
scouts' claim" they were due for loyalty to the United States in
the uprisings of 1862. Moreover, the record indicated that the In-
dians were starving and in desperate need of cash.49 Thus, unlike
tribes who resisted allotment and had the sale of surplus lands
forced on them, the members of the Lake Traverse tribes con-
sented, exactly as the Dawes Act had envisioned °.5 They agreed to
"cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all the
unallotted land within the reservation remaining after the
allotments and additional allotments provided for in article 4
shall have been made." 5 ' Although the 1891 act was still a surplus
lands act, still a product of the allotment policy with a history
very similar to the acts at issue in Mattz and Seymour, the
DeCoteau Court found the language of cession and relinquish-
ment to terminate the reservation.
In Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 2 the Supreme Court also
found that disestablishment had occurred through surplus lands
statutes. The statutes at issue were acts of 1904, 1907, and 1910
that disposed of all unallotted lands in what are now Gregory,
Tripp, Lyman, and Mellette counties in South Dakota. These
counties fell within the boundaries of the Rosebud Sioux Reserva-
tion under the Act of March 2, 1889. 51 As in DeCoteau, the
statutes contained language of cession and relinquishment. 4 Yet,
in Rosebud the cession was not consented to; although an agree-
ment like that in DeCoteau was drafted, three-fourths of the male
members of the Rosebud Tribe did not accept it (on two occa-
sions). Congress unilaterally required the tribe to cede and relin-
quish the surplus lands. Moreover, because Congress did not
want to appropriate money, there was no lump-sum payment.
The sale of the unallotted lands proceeded like the sale on other
49. 420 U.S. at 437.
50. See 24 Stat. 390, § 5 (1889).
51. 420 U.S. at 437.
52. 430 U.S. 584 (1977),
53. 25 Stat. 888.
54. 430 U.S. at 597. The Court said that this language, like that in DeCoteau, was
" 'precisely suited' to disestablishment." Id.
19841
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Indian reservations, pursuant to the homestead and preemption
acts. The absence of voluntary cession, and payment of a lump
sum (voluntary cession and lump-sum payment had seemed to
make the facts of DeCoteau different from those of Mattz and
Seymour), did not deter the Court. Rather, it found that these
had not been dispositive in DeCoteau. What mattered, said the
Rosebud Court, was Congress' intent."
The Court found that intent partly through an analysis of the
legislative history of the acts, which, it said, reflected a desire to
end reservation status. Furthermore, the Court suggested that an
important consideration in determining intent was what happened
after the acts were passed. Although admitting that the subse-
quent jurisdictional history was unclear, the Court concluded that
"the single most salient fact is the unquestioned actual assump-
tion of state jurisdiction over the unallotted lands.
Moreover, the Court noted:
The fact that neither Congress nor the Department of Indian
Affairs has sought to exercise its authority over this area, or to
challenge the State's exercise of authority, is a factor entitled to
weight as a part of the "jurisdictional history." The longstand-
ing assumption of jurisdiction by the State over an area that is
over 90% non-Indian, both in population and in land use, not
only demonstrates the parties' understanding of the meaning of
the Act, but has created justifiable expectations which should
not be upset by so strained a reading of the Acts .... 11
Apparently frustrated by statutory language, which was at
odds with what actually happened (this called into question the
statutory analysis in DeCoteau, and possibly also in other cases),
the Rosebud Court made an incredible leap of logic. It relied
upon subsequent events to infer Congress' intent as to what
should have happened. In light of the history of western lands in
this period, of the continual and massive trespass on Indian lands
55. Id. at 597-98. The Court notes that although the word "cession" is technically
misused, it can still reflect a congressional intent to disestablish. Since Congress did not
use the word to reflect what actually happened, it is unclear why any particular meaning
should be attached to it. As Chief Justice Marshall suggests in his dissent, the words
"cede, surrender, grant, and convey" were probably just borrowed from previous legisla-
tion without any thought given to whether they should reflect any particular congressional
intent, 430 U.S. at 619. See infra text accompanying note 87.
56. 430 U.S. at 603. See also id. at 598-99 (esp. n.20), and at 605 (esp. n.28).




by whites, illegal assertions of state power over Indian reserva-
tions, and continual tension between feder 1 and state authorities
as to jurisdiction (all discussed below), this analysis was com-
pletely wrong. It wholly ignored the history of the allotment
policy and the surplus lands acts found in Mattz, which was ex-
actly the "strained reading" of the acts the Rosebud Tribe wished
to make.
Currently, as a result of these four Supreme Court opinions,
the interpretation of the surplus lands acts is confused. The Court
has said that the surplus lands acts that opened reservations to
sale and settlement did not disestablish reservations. It has
blurred together in dicta a group of statutes which did just
that-opened reservations to settlement-but also had language
of vacation or restoration to the public domain, or termination of
reservation boundaries and status. The Court has said that these
statutes ended reservations and federal jurisdiction. It has said
that language of cession and relinquishment also ended reserva-
tion status, although it has admitted that such language often was
meaningless. Finally, the Court has advanced two historical inter-
pretations of what the allotment process meant for the reserva-
tion system: one, that it ended the reservations, and another, that
it did not.
The doctrinal problems facing the Supreme Court in Solem v.
Bartlett were thus difficult ones. 58 Do phrases such as "opening
to the public domain" reflect congressional intent to terminate
reservation status? What does the general history of the allotment
policy mean for individual surplus lands statutes? What happens
when the legislative history of a statute conflicts with the
statutory language?
Justice Marshall's opinion recognized these questions and
made some attempt to answer them. The Court determined that
the phrases "public domain" and "the reservation thus dimin-
ished" are "isolated phrases" and "hardly dispositive." ' 51 The
Court stated that each surplus land act must be read as a whole.
Yet, the Court did not carry this analysis much farther. It ap-
proved the finding in Rosebud Sioux Tribe that language of ces-
sion and relinquishment strongly suggests reservation disestablish-
ment.60 Thus, the category of statutory language terminating a
58. 104 S.Ct. 1161 (1984).
59. Id. at 1169.
60. Id. at 1166.
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reservation has been reduced by eliminating "public domain"
and "reservation thus diminished." It continues, however, to
contain language of cession and relinquishment, payment of a
sum certain, the abolition of reservation lines, and the discon-
tinuance of reservations.
The Court generally returned to the interpretation of the
history of allotment policy in Mattz v. Arnett: land pressure and
belief in the civilizing effects of land ownership prompted Con-
gress to pass the Dawes Act, which provided a national
framework for allotment, and also to pass later the surplus lands
acts, which were addressed to specific reservations. The Court
recognized too that Congress generally believed or expected at
this time that allotment would lead to the end of the reservations.
But it refused "to extrapolate from this expectation a specific
congressional purpose of diminishing reservations with the
passage of every surplus land act."
'6 1
The Court stated that the reason the surplus lands acts did not
say whether the opened lands retained reservation status was that
"[w]hen the surplus lands acts were passed, the distinction
seemed unimportant. ' 62 "The notion that reservation status of
Indian lands might not be coextensive with tribal ownership was
u:nfamiliar at the turn of the century. ' 63 The Court relied on the
common law for this conclusion, and it found that only in 1948,
with the passage of a statute defining "Indian country," did
Congress "uncouple reservation status from Indian owner-
ship. .... -64 The Court's reading of the history of the acts would
imply that when Congress removed Indian lands from the In-
dians, it assumed that it ended the reservation status of those
lands. This implication is one the Court must surely want to
avoid, given its judgment. As will be discussed below, the Court's
explanation of the absence of provision in the surplus lands acts
for termination of the reservations seems to be new, highly
speculative, and probably inaccurate.
Finally, the Court set out anew the principles of statutory con-
struction pertinent to surplus land acts. It stressed that "only
Congress can divest a reservation of its land and diminish its
boundaries, ' 65 and that "[d]iminishment will not be lightly in-








ferred." 1 Congress must "clearly evince an 'intent to change
boundaries' before diminishment will be found."167 Further, the
Court said that the best evidence of Congress' intent is the
"statutory language used to open Indian lands." ' 68 Moreover, the
Court reaffirmed its policy of giving the Indian tribes the benefit
of the doubt:
When both an act and its legislative history fail to provide sub-
stantial and compelling evidence of a congressional intention to
diminish Indian lands, we are bound by our traditional
solicitude for the Indian tribes to rule that diminishment did
not take place and that the old reservation boundaries survived
the opening. 6
9
This seems to reflect a return to the turn-of-the-century statutory
analysis, which combined a strict reading of the statutes with a
concern to protect the Indian tribes.
Yet, the Court's shift back is only partial. It said that statutory
language is not dispositive when "events surrounding the passage
of a surplus land act-particularly the manner in which the trans-
action was negotiated with the tribes involved and the tenor of
legislative reports presented to Congress-unequivocally reveal a
widely held, contemporaneous understanding that the affected
reservation would shrink as a result .. ."10 Furthermore, the
Court seemed to confirm that what happens after the passage of
an act can figure in statutory construction.7' The Court admitted
that this last index of intent, especially the demographic history
of the opened areas, is "potentially unreliable" and "unor-
thodox. '72 The Court noted, however, that "in the area of the
surplus land acts, where various factors kept Congress from
focusing on the diminishment issue . . the technique is a
necessary expedient." 73 The use of the subsequent history to
determine Congress' intent, while it might have produced the
right result in Solem, has the potential of producing wrong results




69. Id. at 1167.
70. Id. at 1166.
71. Id. at 1167.
72. Id. at n.13.
73. Id.
74. See supra text accompanying note 57.
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discussed in greater detail below, the object of many persons
moving onto the reservations pursuant to the surplus lands acts
was to subvert federal policy and Indian rights. The federal
agents and tribes were often unable to maintain their jurisdiction
in the face of land speculators and state officials. The Court's
resignation to the expedient of using subsequent history to inter-
pret surplus lands acts may in some cases be diametrically
opposed to its "traditional solicitude" for the Indian tribes.
Applying the various principles it described to the Act of 1908,
the Court in Solem found neither the statutory language nor the
history of the Act sufficiently clear to conclude that Congress in-
tended to change the reservation boundaries. Further, the Court
pointed to a significant Indian population in the opened areas;
"de facto diminishment" had not occurred. In the absence of
congressional intent to disestablish, and in light also of the In-
dians' presence in the opened areas, the Court fell back on the
presumption that the original reservation boundaries remain in-
tact.
At this point, then, the Court has contracted slightly the
category of statutory language that causes reservation
disestablishment. Yet, it has approved its previous interpretations
of the words "cession" and "relinquishment" in surplus lands
acts. It has reaffirmed partially its use of allotment policy history
in interpreting the acts, but has refrained from saying that the
allotment policy positively envisioned the continuation of the
reservations until they were expressly ended. Rather, the Court
has adopted a weaker (and somewhat risky) reading of the
history, i.e., no one thought about whether reservations con-
tinued when they were opened up to white ownership. Finally, the
Court has partially shifted back to the standard of construction
favored by courts in the late 1800s and early 1900s, a standard
that focused on the language of the statutes and construed am-
biguities in favor of the Indian tribes. Yet, the Court has not
given up its reliance on surrounding circumstances and legislative
history. Moreover, it has voiced approval, albeit cautious ap-
proval, for the idea that in cases of vagueness, subsequent
jurisdictional and demographic history of surplus lands acts
should figure in their construction.
The Language of the Acts in the Parlance
of Federal Public Lands Legislation
The Supreme Court has said certain surplus lands acts contain




reservations to settlement. Analysis of the statutes shows that
these distinctions often made little sense and that courts should
not hinge the issue of reservation status on them.
First, comparison of the acts shows that they were all designed
to accomplish the same thing, a real estate transaction. They
generally contained detailed descriptions of what lands would be
sold, how they were to be appraised, surveyed, and sold, and
what would happen to the proceeds of sale.75 Generally, the acts
made no mention of altering reservation boundaries, extending
state law over opened areas, or diminishing federal jurisdiction
over the Indians. Many statutes alluded to, or incorporated, pro-
visions of the Dawes Allotment Act, implying that Congress
acknowledged and intended to supplement it.7' Read in its en-
tirety, each statute gives the impression that it was designed only
to accomplish a transfer of lands to individuals. Language that
"restores to the public domain" or "cedes and relinquishes unal-
lotted lands," if meant to end the reservations, would have been
out of place for nothing else in these statutes made a similar pro-
vision.
Indeed, a body of case law gives strong support to the argu-
ment, approved in Solem v. Bartlett, that the public domain
language in surplus lands acts carried little meaning. This case
law indicates that when the phrase "public domain" was used in
federal public lands legislation, it merely referred to land
available for sale or disposition under the general land laws.
"Public domain" was used interchangeably with "public
lands." 7 In Southern Pacific Railroad v. Ambler Grains & Mill-
ing,78 the court summarized the meaning of "'public lands":
What is meant by "public lands" is well-settled. As stated in
Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761, 763, 23 L. Ed. 769, 770: "The
words 'public lands' are habitually used in our legislation to
describe such as are subject to sale or other disposal under
general laws." Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481-490, 21 S. Ct.
690, 45 L. Ed. 963-968; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S.
373-391, 22 S. Ct. 650, 46 L. Ed. 954-964. If it is claimed in
75. Compare these acts: Act of May 29, 1908, 35 Stat. 458; Act of May 29, 1908, 35
Stat. 460; Act of July 1, 1892, 27 Stat. 62. Note that the Act of July 1, 1892 allowed In-
dians to remain on the opened part of the reservation.
76. The Act of July 1, 1892, 27 Stat. 62, and the Act of May 27, 1902, 32 Stat. 245,
263, alluded to the allotment process of the Dawes Act.
77. Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481, 490 (1900).
78. 66 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1933).
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any given case that they are used in a different meaning, it
should be apparent either from the context or from the circum-
stances attending the legislation.
79
Thus, when Congress said that reservation land would be
"restored to the public domain and made subject to entry," 8 it
was being repetitive. Any additional meaning (as to changes in
jurisdiction over Indians, or in the extent of the reservations)
would have to have been apparent from the rest of the statute (as
noted above, it generally was not), or from the "surrounding cir-
cumstances" (as will be discussed below, this also was not ap-
parent).
The "cession and relinquishment" language found in statutes
like the Act of April 23, 1904,81 also seems out of place, if it was
intended to reduce the size of the reservation. The 1904 act pro-
vided, exactly as the statute in Mattz v. Arnett did, for the open-
ing and sale of unallotted lands under the general federal land
laws and for the payment of the proceeds to the Rosebud Tribe.2
The United States was not committed to purchase the unallotted
laads outright from the Indians; rather, the "intention of this act
[was] that the United States shall act as a trustee for said Indians
to dispose of said lands and to expend and pay over the proceeds
received from the sale thereof only as received." 3 Further, the
act provided for the exception of tracts in the unallotted lands for
the subissue station, the Indian day school, and the Catholic and
Congregational missions.14 It allowed tribal members to have
allotments in the opened sections." Finally, the 1904 act provided
that nothing in the agreement "shall be construed to deprive the
said Indians of the Rosebud Reservation, South Dakota, of any
benefits to which they are entitled under existing treaties and
agreements, not inconsistent with the provisions of this agree-
ment." 8  This last term was an explicit direction to courts to
79. Id. at 674.
80. Act of Aug. 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 286, 337-38.
81. 33 Stat. 254. This statute was discussed in Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at
597-98. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
82. 33 Stat. 254, art. III; art. V, §§ 2, 3.
83. Id., art. V, § 6.
84. Id., art. V, § 2.
85. Id., art. I. See also the acts of 1907 (34 Stat. 1230) and 1910 (36 Stat. 448), which
also were to this effect, and allowed Indians without allotments in opened areas to secure
them there. Justice Marshall discussed these acts in Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at
621.
86. 33 Stat. 254, art. V, § 1.
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minimize conflicts with the Treaty of 1889, which established the
reservation boundaries.
A reading of the 1904 act in its entirety (as the Solem Court
suggests should be done) reveals that the act was intended
primarily to authorize the sale of unallotted lands on the reserva-
tion. Indian rights and landholdings, and federal agency and mis-
sion activities were to continue in the opened parts of the reserva-
tions. At most, the cession and relinquishment language meant
the giving up of a proprietary interest in the surplus land so that
it could be sold to whites. At the least, as Justice Marshall has
suggested, the language was copied from an earlier draft of the
agreement (which had been rejected by Congress) with little or no
thought given to its implications for reservation status.87
"Cession and relinquishment" language, like "public domain"
language, should not be taken out of the context of the statute.
The only language that should be interpreted to reduce reserva-
tions and to alter their boundaries is language that does so ex-
plicitly, such as language in the statutes affecting the Smith River,
the Ponca, and the Missouria and Otoe reservations. 8
The analysis of Bryan v. Itasca County reinforces this conclu-
sion.8 9 Bryan suggests that the question for determining Con-
gress' intent in the surplus lands acts is whether Congress was
capable of expressing more clearly a change in the political or
legal status of Indians than through the disputed language in the
surplus lands acts.
The answer to the question posed by the Court in Bryan is yes.
As just noted, Congress did explicitly redraw reservation bound-
aries, abolish them, and alter jurisdictional status when that was
its purpose. 90 Indeed, the Dawes Allotment Act (as amended by
the Burke Act) contains language setting out a process by which
state or territorial law would be extended over the Indians. 9' The
surplus lands acts, which often incorporated the Dawes Act,
87. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 619.
88. See supra text at notes 45-51 and note 90 infra.
89. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
90. See, e.g., the Act of 1904, 33 Stat. 218, which provided that "the reservation
lines of the said Ponca and Otoe and Missouria Indian reservations be, and the same are
hereby, abolished; and the territory comprising said reservations shall be attached to and
become a part of the counties of Kay, Pawnee and Noble, in Oklahoma territory .... "
See United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 290-91 (1909), which discusses the ability of
Congress to answer these questions.
91. See section 6 of the Dawes Act, as amended by the Burke Act, now codified at
25 U.S.C. § 349 (1982).
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made no attempt to alter that process. Examining other statutes
of the period thus shows that Congress was able to fashion
specific statutory language that would dismantle reservations and
change jurisdictional relations. It did not do this with the surplus
lands acts.
[I. The Surrounding Circumstances and Legislative History:
The Surplus Lands Acts Taken in the Context of the
Allotment System
Putting aside for a moment all the various practical objections
to using a historical approach in discussing old statutes, the
discussion below assumes, as did the Court in Mattz and Solem,
that the meaning of the surplus lands acts can be clarified
through study of the prevailing federal Indian policy at the time
the acts were passed, the allotment policy. This policy was first
adopted by Congress as a national framework for dealing with
the Indian reservations in the Dawes Allotment Act of 1887.92
This section will consider the history of the allotment policy as
developed in the Dawes Act and later legislation, including the
surplus lands acts, with the aim of judging the effect of the allot-
ment process on the reservation system.
As has been noted above, the courts have developed two views
of allotment policy: one view is that it envisioned the abolition of
reservations, and the other view is that it did not. The former has
often been supported by reliance on statements made by officials
in government and members of various Indian reform organiza-
tions during the period leading to the passage of the Dawes Allot-
ment Act. 93 Yet there was often a serious gap between what the
92. 24 Stat. 390.
93. See, e.g., Ute Indian Tribe, Nos. 81-1827, 81-1901 slip op. at 11-12 (10th Cir. Aug.
29, 1983). In Ute Indian Tribe, the Tenth Circuit quotes Secretary of the Interior Schurz, who
in 1880 stated that allotment would put relations between Indians and whites on a "new
basis, by gradually doing away with the system of large reservations, which has so fre-
quently provoked those encroachments which in the past have led to so much cruel in-
justice." Id. at 12. The Tenth Circuit refers to Schurz's remarks as comments on the
Dawes Act when it was pending as a bill. Id. The Dawes Bill, however, was not intro-
duced until Dec. 8, 1885, 17 CONG. REC. 123 (1885), 49th Cong. 1st Sess. Further, in
1881, Schurz made clear that he saw the end to be reached by allotment as the "gradual
absorption of Indians" into the body politic. He does not appear to have favored the im-
mediate abolition of the reservations. See NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW 8 (July, 1881), cited
in S. Taylor, "The Origins of the Dawes Act of 1887 (1927)" (Washburn Prize Thesis,




reformers hoped allotment would eventually do for the Indians
and what members of Congress envisioned particular allotment
legislation would accomplish.
As will become clear from the discussion below, considerable
disagreement existed about the effects of allotment. Moreover,
from this debate it is not altogether clear what the immediate his-
torical forces or "surrounding circumstances" were that even-
tually led to passage of the Dawes Act.
The idea of allotment first gained prominence in the early
1800s and was incorporated into various Indian treaties. The idea
was simple in theory: an Indian, by privately owning and
cultivating a piece of land, would become civilized. The Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs, T. Hartley Crawford, expressed a
widely held opinion when he wrote that without allotment in
severalty "you will look in vain for any general casting off of
savagism. Common property and civilization cannot co-exist." 94
The idea that owning private property would civilize the In-
dians was taken up with moral fervor by reformers after the Civil
War. It became the animus of a crusade for the solution to the
"Indian question." In the minds of members of the Women's
National Indian Association, and later the Indian Rights Associa-
tion, allotment would transform the Indians from a corn-
munalistic primitive to an individualistic and industrious yeoman
farmer."
The reformers also believed that allotment would save some In-
dian land from white encroachment. 96 The Indian Commissioner
wrote in 1879 of the extent of intrusion by white settlers and spec-
ulators:
In fact there is hardly a reservation within the limits of the
United States which has not been subject to their en-
croachments. They resort to all kinds of devices and schemes to
obtain a foothold on Indian soil, and offer ready and varied
excuses for their continued unlawful occupany of the Same.
9 7
The Indian Rights Association Report for 1887 stated, "We have
REFORMERS AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 213 (1971) on Schurz's view that allotment should
take place gradually.
94. Crawford wrote this in 1838. It is cited by Francis Prucha in his introduction to
D. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS, at x (1973).
95. See OTIS, supra note 94, at 33-34.
96. Id. at 31.
97. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS XLIV (1879).
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to choose between securing something for the Indians-as much
as we can get-or having them lose all." 9
While the writings of the "friends of the Indian" indicate that
allotment was justified as a means of salvaging something for the
Indian in the face of white encroachment, a more difficult ques-
tion is whether white land seekers supported allotment. On this,
opinion is divided, and there is little concrete evidence proving
directly that land seekers actively supported allotment.9 9 Land
seekers no doubt preferred complete and immediate cession of all
Indian lands. Yet, in the face of congressional resistance to that,
they may have been content with allotment. Allotment promised
eventual sale of the unallotted, or surplus, lands. 00
The Minority Report of the House Indian Affairs Committee
in 1880 points to this less benevolent purpose:
The real aim of this bill is to get at the Indian lands and open
them up to settlement. The provisions for the apparent benefit
of the Indian are but the pretext to get at his lands and occupy
them .... If this was done in the name of Greed, it would be
bad enough; but to do it in the name of Humanity, and under
the cloak of an ardent desire to promote the Indian's welfare
by making him like ourselves, whether he will or not, is infin-
itely worse.' 0 0
Indeed, it is strange that those who supported allotment per-
sisted in the face of knowledge that most previous experiments with
allotment had ended in failure (at least for the Indians). The Chip-
pewas, the Catawbas, the Shawnees, the Potawatomis, and the
Kickapoos lost all or most of their lands through allotment. His-
tory attested that allotment was a formula for dispossession. t0
This dreary history prompted Senator Teller of Colorado to
state in 1881, in debate on an allotment bill, that:
If I stand alone in the Senate, I want to put upon the record
my prophecy . . . that when thirty or forty years shall have
passed and these Indians shall have parted with their title, they
will curse the hand that was raised professedly in their defense
to secure this kind of legislation and if the people who are
clamoring for it understood the Indian character, and Indian
98. 5th ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INDIAN RIGHTS Assoc. 38 (1888).
99. OTIS, supra note 94, at 31.
100. Id.
101. H.R. REP. No. 1576, 46th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1880).




laws, and Indian morals, and Indian religion, they would not
be here clamoring for this at all."3
Opposition to allotment came, too, from the Indians. In 1881
the Five Civilized Tribes submitted a petition against allotment
on the grounds that it would lead to loss of their lands and re-
moval."0 4 Resistance continued after the passage of the Dawes
Act, and petitions came to Congress continually through the
1890s and early 1900s. 05
Other forces were at work in the allotment debate. One was
general concern with the expense of the Indian wars and the re-
servation system. Advocates of allotment believed it would relieve
government from supporting Indians by making them self-
sufficient and by forming a fund from sale of the surplus lands to
be applied to their improvement."' 6 The Reports of the Board of
Indian Commissioners indicate that allotment was expected to cut
federal outlays.10 7 But, the expense argument was used both
ways: whites settled on the borders of Indian reservations
opposed allotment because they feared the Indians would rapidly
lose their lands and become paupers and a burden on local
government.'° 8
Samuel Taylor presents a convincing argument that the future
of the cattle syndicates was also at stake in the allotment debate.
In the 1880s cattle companies had leased vast acreages from In-
dian tribes, such as the Crows in Montana and the Five Civilized
Tribes. 10 9 These syndicates opposed allotment (and may have
been successful in preventing it in Indian Territory). Moreover,
some white settlers viewed allotment as a way of breaking up the
cattle interests by making the leasing of Indian lands more dif-
ficult., 10
103. 11 CONG. REc. 783 (Jan. 20, 1881). See discussion in OTIS, supra note 94, at 18.
104. OTIS, supra note 94, at 51.
105. Protests against allotment: H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 18, 47th Cong., 2d Sess.; S.
Misc. Doc. No. 119, 48th Cong., 1st Sess.; Report of protest of Coeur d'Alene Indians
to sale of surplus lands, H.R. REP. No. 3352, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.; Testimonial of the
Indians of the Quapaw Agency, S. REP. 615, 52d Cong., 1st Sess.
106. MARDOCK, supra note 93, at 222. See also J. KINNEY, A CONTINENT LosT--A
CIVILIZATION WON 187, 190, 204 (1937).
107. See discussion in OTIS, supra note 94, at 88, 100-04.
108. So Judge Draper told the Fifth Mohonk Conference. LAKE MOHONK CONF.
PROC. 18-19 (1887); OTIS, supra note 94, at 160 n.33.
109. Taylor, supra note 93, at 38. See also remarks of Rep. Springer, 18 CONG. REC.
226, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. (1886).
110. Taylor, supra note 93, at 38.
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The allotment idea, then, in the years up to the passage of the
Dawes Act, had varied supporters (and opponents) whose
motives were complex. To take the aim of any one group as the
"purpose" of allotment, or the intent of Congress in passing an
allotment bill, would be a grave error. If anything can be gleaned
from the allotment debate in the years leading up to the intro-
duction of the Dawes Bill, it is only a very general idea as to what
the "surrounding circumstances" of the bill were. The most
significant of these seemed to be white land pressure and concern
for the expense of supporting dependent Indians. Neither of
these, however, was necessarily inconsistent with continuing the
jurisdictional boundaries of the reservations.
In striking contrast to the reform literature on the allotment
idea and early congressional debates on allotment bills, the
legislative history of the Dawes Act is relatively sparse and incon-
clusive. The Act itself provided that each reservation Indian
would be allotted a tract of land on the reservation. On allot-
ment, the Indian would receive a trust patent and become a
citizen. For twenty-five years the allotted land was inalienable,
and at the end of that period the allottee would receive a fee pa-
tent. On completion of the allotment process, the allotted Indians
would be subject to state or territorial civil and criminal laws.
The unallotted or surplus lands could, in the discretion of the ex-
ecutive branch and with the Indians' consent, be purchased from
the Indians and sold. The proceeds of sale would go to the
federal Treasury and could be paid out by Congress for the In-
dians' benefit.' 1'
The Dawes Act was passed quickly, in little more than a
year. 12 It apparently was hurried through Congress. The commit-
tee reports that survive furnish little insight, and the debates were
generally brief and focused on minor points." I3 Some parts of the
debates are of value, however, in providing an idea of the in-
tentions of those who formulated the allotment policy.
111. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1976).
112. The bill, S. 54, was introduced on Dec. 8, 1885, and passed in the spring of 1887.
17 CONG. Rac. 123, 49th Cong., Ist Sess. (1885); 18 CONG. REc. 1577, 49th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1887).
113. 18 CONG. REC. 190, 225, 975-77, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. (1887). The only com-
mittee report that survives is the conference report. It lists amendments, but gives little or
no explanation. The debates are admittedly of much less value than the committee





In general, the records of debates on the Dawes Bill show that
although allotment was expected to end tribal relations and the
reservation system, it was meant to do so gradually, with many of
the details left to the future. Senator Skinner of North Carolina
stated:
[The Bill] means that the tribal relations must be broken up;
that the practice of massing large numbers of Indians on reser-
vations must be stopped; that lands must be allotted in sev-
eralty; that where there is more land in any reservation than the
Indians can profitably use, such lands must be so disposed of
that the white man may get possession of them and come in
contact with the Indians. We offer the pending bill, intending
for it to fill the full measure of these requirements, and believ-
ing that it points out the most direct route to citizenship for the
Indians." t
4
While Senator Skinner indicated that the Dawes Act was meant
to cause drastic change, he did not say when the change would
occur. Other congressmen recognized that the Act would not
civilize the Indians overnight. Congressman Holman, discussing
the sale of surplus lands, the last stage of the allotment process,
stated that "many years must elapse before those lands will be
sold. . .. They are not going to be sold next year or the year
after, or for several years to come.""' 5
Moreover, the debates reflected concern that the Act was in-
complete and left too many details to future congresses or the ex-
ecutive. Senator Dolph believed that the Act gave too much
freedom to future congresses to decide how to spend the proceeds
of sale of surplus lands and so possibly to squander them. Dolph
suggested an amendment, but like other amendments it was not
included because it was submitted too late. Dolph commented:
"We are now passing a law that is in the nature of an agreement
and contract with these Indians, and certainly it is prudent to put
it in the best shape in which it can be placed." '"16 Dolph's com-
114. 18 CONG. REC. 190, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. (1886).
115. Id. at 225.
116. Id. at 974. Since the Dawes Act did not provide that land sale proceeds should be
saved any length of time, the fate of the Indians and the allotment system beyond the
period of inalienability was dependent on future appropriations. As Commissioner of In-
dian Affairs Thomas Morgan wrote in 1891: "No change in the practical administration
of Indian affairs can alter the one fundamental, absolutely indispensable condition to its
success, growing out of the fact that the money requisite must come by vote of
Congress." The Present Phase of the Indian Question, in THE INDIAN PROBLEM 6 (1891).
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ment, and his prediction that after twenty-five years the Indians
would be paupers, were glossed over by Senator Dawes, who
stated that future congresses would be able to take care of future
exigencies. " I7
Thus, while there is evidence that the Dawes Act was expected
to break up tribal relations and to end the reservation system,
there is also evidence that this was expected to take many years
and that Congress was expected to supplement the provisions of
the Dawes Act with other legislation. Moreover, aside from
Senator Skinner's remarks, no discussion of an end to the reser-
vations or of change in the Indians' legal status occurred. Con-
gress simply did not say when it expected the allotment process to
be complete.
This does not mean that these issues were not before Congress.
On the contrary, at the time the Dawes Bill was debated Congress
received numerous petitions to abolish and open to settlement
various reservations. ' Furthermore, Congress had considered
and rejected allotment bills that also generally changed the limits
of reservations. For example, S. 931 in the Forty-seventh Con-
gress was drafted to provide "for the improvement of the condi-
tion of uncivilized Indians, the reduction of the reservations to
proper limits, the making of the same permanent, and the allot-
ment thereof and the granting of patents in severalty."' 9 Indeed,
around the time the Dawes Act was passed, and afterwards, Con-
gress enacted laws dealing with specific reservation boundaries
(both enlarging and contracting them) and jurisdiction. 20 This
suggests that Congress separated the question of land tenure from
that of jurisdictional boundaries. It also suggests that Congress
intentionally omitted provisions affecting boundaries and
jurisdiction from the Dawes Act.
The drafters of the Dawes Bill may have had good political
reasons for omitting clauses that would abolish reservations and
immediately immerse the Indians in white society. Many of the
early allotment bills had been bogged down because they sought
to address questions more controversial than a change in land
117. 18 CONG. REC. 973-76, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. (1887).
118. In the second session of the Forty-ninth Congress, petitions were received from
settlers and state and territorial legislatures to open the Coeur d'Alene, the Sioux, and the
Crow Creek reservations. See 18 CONG. REC. 349, 1736, 1801 (1887).
119. 13(2) CONG. REC. 1824, 47th Cong., 1st Sess. (1882).




tenure. When the Coke Bill was first proposed, for example, the
Committee on Indian Affairs purposely left out a citizenship pro-
vision.'' Senator Pendleton explained:
The committee sought carefully in the framing of this bill to
avoid questions which might give rise to as great a difference of
opinion as that subject [citizenship] will. Their purpose was to
strip the bill, as far as possible, of all extraneous questions and
to direct the attention of Senators solely to the question of the
tenure by which the Indians should hold their property. And
this was done not because they sought to avoid any responsibil-
ity, or because they sought to leave the Indians in any unpro-
tected position, to leave them where their fights could not be
asserted in the completest and fullest form, but because they
were extremely anxious that this bill should be stripped of
every other question than the single one of holding in severalty
of the lands of the Indians. 2 '
Admittedly Senator Pendleton made these comments several
years before the Dawes Bill was introduced, and so their applica-
tion to the Dawes Bill is only speculative. Still they indicate that
congressional committees consciously omitted controversial
topics from allotment bills. The absence of reservation boundary
provisions is all the more striking in light of this parliamentary
strategy.
Moreover, the Congress that considered the Dawes Bill was ap-
parently reluctant to reduce reservations or remove Indians. A
series of Sioux bills, reducing the great Sioux Reservation, had
been rejected (one, in fact, had been introduced by Senator
Dawes). 23 This resistance in Congress to wholesale division and
reduction of reservations might have hindered the Dawes Bill if it
had contained such provisions.
Finally, Congress may have left the reservation system (the
agencies, restrictive laws, and army) intact as a precautionary
measure. Allotment was an experiment. Persons within and out-
side Congress harbored doubts as to whether it would succeed.
The Indians often opposed allotment, as their petitions and
memorials to Congress proved.' 24 They might resist, and allot-
121. 11 CONG. REc. 904, 46th Cong., 2d Sess. (1881) (debate on S. 1773).
122. Id.
123. See supra note 118.
124. See supra notes 104, 105 and accompanying text.
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ment might have to be imposed. If allotment did not work,
federal guardianship, carried out through the reservation system,
would have to continue. Although little in the congressional
record (except that the process would be gradual and that other
legislation would be needed) expresses these points, the
undeniable fact is that the reservation system did continue and
was strengthened as the allotment of Indian lands was im-
plemented. Indeed, land was allotted and Indians were controlled
on allotments through the reservation system. 12 This suggests
that the fact that the reservation system would have to continue
in the period of implementation was simply too obvious to
mention.
Beginning in the 1890s, and with increasing frequency in the
early 1900s, Congress passed acts that applied the allotment pro-
cess to individual reservations and provided for the sale of the
surplus lands.'"6 As noted earlier, courts have often interpreted
these acts in light of the allotment policy of the Dawes Act. Their
grounds for doing so have been that the surplus lands acts were
passed largely out of congressional impatience with the slowness
of implementation of the allotment process by the executive
branch.2 Since most surplus lands acts incorporated by
reference parts of the Dawes Allotment Act and deviated little in
the remainder of their provisions from the Dawes process, this is
probably true. Nevertheless, each surplus lands act had its own
legislative history (some more detailed than others). Although
this essay will not present a detailed study of any particular act's
history, it will summarize several justifications that often ap-
peared and will relate those to the allotment process of the Dawes
Act.
First, it was argued that opening the reservations to settlement
would better the condition of the Indians. As the House Com-
mittee Report on a bill to open the Uintah Reservation noted: "If
the residue of the lands are settled by whites the Indians will be
more directly brought in contact with civilization and be able to
make greater progress by the example thus afforded them."'
' 2 8
125. Onis, supra note 94, at 52.
126. For examples of these acts, see supra note 2.
127. Under the Dawes Act the President was not required to, but could in his discre-
tion, open the reservations to allotment and sale. The Court in Mattz points to congres-
sional desire to assure allotment by a surplus lands act, when the President had not yet
ordered allotment. The Court also notes the more benevolent purpose of encouraging in-
teraction between the races. 412 U.S. at 496-97. See also Seymour, 368 U.S. at 356.




Second, proceeds from the sale of the surplus lands were in-
tended to pay for various improvements on the reservations
(which Indians needed to become allotment farmers). In its report
on the disposal of unallotted lands on the Yakima Reservation,
the House Committee of Indian Affairs noted that monies from
the sale were needed for irrigation, wagons, houses, farm im-
plements, and "other necessary and useful articles as may be
deemed best to promote [the Indians'] welfare and aid them in
the adoption of civilized pursuits and in improving and building
homes for themselves.'
129
Finally, the lands were sold because of white pressure for
settlement. This factor was mentioned often in committee
reports. 3  Indeed, white land hunger appears to have had a
stronger, more direct effect in the passage of the surplus lands
acts than in the passage of the Dawes Act.
In general, then, the purposes of the surplus lands acts were to
improve the Indians' condition, to allow whites to settle on the
reservations, and to reduce the cost of making the allotment
system work. All these were consistent with the purposes of the
allotment system created by the Dawes Act, and they can fairly
be said to have been part of a continuing "allotment policy." At
no point do legislative histories, however, mention a dismantling
of the reservation system or termination of federal jurisdiction or
guardianship. Indeed, many surplus lands acts applied allotment
for the first time to reservations, while others allowed the sale of
surplus lands before allotment was completed."'3 This would sug-
gest that the surplus lands acts did not complete the allotment
process, and so were not the legislation the Forty-ninth Congress
envisioned would end the reservation system.
The silence of the Dawes Act on questions of jurisdiction and
the timing of the breakdown of the reservations did not go un-
noticed. This deficiency was readily pointed out, especially by
members of the legal community. Their criticism provides con-
129. H.R. REP. No. 2346, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1904).
130. See, e.g., id. and H.R. Doc. No. 191, 54th Cong., Ist Sess. 18 (1896).
131. The Uncompahgre Act of Aug. 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 337-38, applied allotment for
the first time. Most surplus lands acts provided that sale of the surplus lands should occur
after the "completion" of allotment. In practice, though, the surplus lands were
sometimes opened when considerable numbers of Indians still had not taken allotments.
See M. JOHNSTON, FEDERAL RELATIONS WITH THE GREAT SIOUX INDIANS OF SOUTH
DAKOTA, 1887-1933, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO LAND POLICY UNDER THE DAWES
ACT 95, 103 (1948).
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siderable insight into what the allotment process was intended to
accomplish.
James B. Thayer of Harvard Law School, a constitutional law
professor, published a cutting analysis of the Dawes Act in The
Atlantic Monthly of March, 1888. Thayer described the "exact
scope" of the law: "It deals with two subjects only, namely, the
ownership of land and citizenship. These things have no
necessary connection with each other."' 32 He continued:
Of these two things, it is the land question with which the
severalty law is primarily and mainly taken up,-with provi-
sions looking first to securing to the individual Indians the
ownership of separate parcels of land; and second, after taking
out land enough to satisfy these separate allotments, to getting
the rest of the reservations into the market, and thus opening
them to settlement and occupancy by the whites.'
The process by which the lands were to be divided and pur-
chased from the Indians, Thayer noted, was left entirely to the
executive's discretion.13 The speed of this process, he pointed
out, was likely to be related to pressures brought by the "land-
grabber.""'
Thayer noted that citizenship was dealt with in only a few
lines, which were "not free from ambiguity. ' '3 6 Thayer seemed
to have accepted Dawes's interpretation of the act that persons
who took allotments and patents became citizens immediately.
Yet, he suggested that there was room for uncertainty as to when
the Indians and the reservation would become subject to state or
territorial law.
[W]hen all the Indians on any reservation have thus been made
citizens (and perhaps as each in succession becomes a citizen),
they are to pass from under the special control of Congress and
to come, so far as Congress may authorize this, under the
jurisdiction of the States and Territories.'
Thayer preferred the view that state and territorial law would not
132. Thayer, The Dawes Bill and the Indians, 61 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 316 (Mar.
1888).
133. Id.
134. Thayer, supra note 132, at 318.
135. Id.
136. Id.




extend to the reservation until the completion of the allotment
process. Moreover, he suggested that this extension would not oc-
cur automatically, but by congressional authorization, and that
even then Congress could restrict the power of the states or ter-
ritories over the Indians.
Thayer proceeded to consider "what [the Act] does not ac-
complish, and does not aim at. It is hardly necessary to say that
the law does not seek to reach these grave results at once. That is
apparent on the face of it.""13 He noted that the act did not apply
to a large number of reservations and that it provided for no
courts or system of law on the allotted reservations.' 39 He noted
that under the act the allottees still could not lease, make con-
tracts respecting, or exchange their lands. He pointed out that the
act did not provide for roads or other public improvements, 140
and that it failed also to provide any sort of education. Not only
was the law, in Thayer's view, ambiguous and its application
uncertain, it was incomplete.
Thayer made a remarkable observation about the effect of the
Dawes Act: "It leaves the whole reservation system untouched."'1 4
The nonintercourse acts, the restraints on trade and travel by out-
siders, the absolute power of the federal government, he noted, all
continued as before. Even more, Thayer suggested that legislation
was needed to end this state of affairs and to have the ordinary laws
of the land applied by the general government to the Indians. But,
he cautioned, "as regards this last matter it would seem wise to
wait a little, until it can be seen just how, and how fast, the
severalty law is likely to work."' 142
Concern about the gradualness of the allotment process, the in-
completeness of the act's provisions, and the uncertainty resulting
from both of those, was also expressed by the Law Committee of
the Indian Rights Association:
Even where a reservation is made subject to allotment by the
exercise of the discretionary authority of the Executive, the
time at which the Indians residing on it become subject as a
138. Id at 320.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 321.
141. Id.
142. Id. Concern about the need for additional legislation was widespread among the
reformers. The Fifth Mohonk Conference resolved that other legislation was needed. See
OTIS, supra note 94, at 59-60.
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whole, to the local law, and entitled to citizenship, is still
uncertain .... The effect of the Dawes Act, while beginning at
once, will yet be gradually exerted, but also... a large number
of Indians may be expected for a considerable time to be
unable to avail themselves of its most important provisions.
... The Dawes Act is principally for the disposition of Indian
land in severalty, and it seems desirable to supplement its pro-
visions for the ultimate extension of law over the Indians...
by some further legislation."4 3
Like Thayer, the Law Committee recognized that additional
legislation was needed to substitute state for federal and tribal
jurisdiction.
Austin Abbott, writing in the Harvard Law Review, also
recognized that a period of time must pass before the Indian
would be subject to state or territorial law:
This period must necessarily be considerable. It will take a con-
siderable number of years to complete the process of optional
allotments by which Indians are made citizens. Additional time
will be needed for compulsory allotments. After allotments are
made, a quarter of a century must be allowed before the lands
can all be subjected to taxation, and, therefore, before the
State and Territorial courts can be expected to bear the burden
of administering justice to Indians and whites without distinc-
tion. 14
4
Abbott pointed to a grave difficulty in the Dawes Act:
Although the act purported to provide a process by which local
law would extend over the Indian, it hindered that process by
exempting Indians from taxes needed to support local govern-
ment.'4  The states simply would not provide protection or
government services unless Indians paid taxes. Moreover, even if
local courts had been provided for Indians, Abbott noted, "anti-
pathies of race and the animosities of warfare, must deprive trial
by jury of much of the effectiveness and the confidence necessary
to its usefulness."'
' 4 6
Concern about lack of law (state or federal) on reservations,
and the Indian's uncertain legal status, prompted Professor
143. FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INDIAN RIGHTS Assoc. 5-6 (1887).
144. Abbot, Indians and the Law, 2 HARV. L. REV. 167, 176 (1888).
145. Id at 175-76.




Thayer, Austin Abbott, and Phillip C. Garrett of Philadelphia to
draft a statute extending law to and creating courts on the reser-
vations. The "Thayer Bill," as it was known, provided that
Indians, whether citizens or not, would no longer be subject to
restrictions on trade, contracts, and power to sue (with certain
qualifications while the reservation system continued). The cor-
nerstone of the bill was section 3, which provided for "the im-
mediate extension over every reservation of the civil and criminal
laws of the State or territory in which it [was] situated, with sav-
ings clauses [to protect against] local legislation unfavorable to
the Indians.""' Since reliance on state and territorial courts was
impracticable for a long time, the bill provided for the creation of
commissioners' courts having jurisdiction over all civil and
criminal (but not capital) cases where an Indian was a party. The
bill also provided for committing magistrates for each reserva-
tion, exercising powers in aid of the commissioners' courts.'
The Thayer Bill was introduced in the United States Senate by
Senator Dawes in 1888 (although he did not approve it). It did
not gain much support, largely because it was complicated and
would involve great expense. It was still in committee in 1891. At
the American Bar Association Meeting in 1891, Professor Thayer
tried to drum up support for his bill. He succeeded in getting the
Association to pass unanimously a resolution that the United
States should provide a system of courts and law for the reserva-
tions. 149
The discussion at the meeting indicated that it was commonly
accepted that progress under the Dawes Act was bound to be
slow. Thayer observed: "[The Dawes Act] can and will, perhaps,
finally dispose of the Indian Question. The question is, however,
as to the time it will take."' 0 Thayer predicted that at the present
rate it would take sixty years.1 5' Moreover, he stated that, aside
from the Major Crimes Act, the United States furnished no law
over the Indians, "and of course there is no law furnished by any
State for these Indians as among themselves."' 5 One of the par-
ticipants, Adelbert Moot, remarked that on many reservations,
147. Id. at 177-78.
148. Id.
149. 14 REP. OF THE A.B.A. 14-25 (1891).
150. Id. at 18.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 14.
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such as those of the Iroquois in New York, the Indians lived in
peace and prosperity, occasionally using the state courts outside
the reservation, without need of any federal law. John Sanborn
of Minnesota, however, noted that the prejudice and bias against
Indians in state courts was so strong that the Indians' rights were
like those "enjoyed by the slaves in the Southern states before the
war.
, 1 5 3
While the Thayer Bill never passed (largely because of the cost
it was expected to involve), its proposal reflected the fact that
lawyers saw the Dawes Act as deficient. The Dawes Act simply
did not dismantle the reservation system; rather, the Thayer Bill
was intended to do that and to fill the void that would result.
The legal community's criticism of the Dawes Act brought into
bold relief the fact that the Dawes allotment policy was almost
entirely a policy of land tenure. Its main accomplishment was
that it made possible the separation of tribal land holdings into
common areas and individual allotments, and then provided for
the eventual sale of the common areas to whites. The act did this
while leaving the reservation system, with all its restrictions, in-
tact. As a result, the legal status of the Indian became even more
complex. The act produced uncertainty as to when local law
would be extended over the reservations, and also as to when
federal and tribal jurisdiction would end.
As the previous discussion has indicated, a number of lawyers
believed that the Dawes Act caused only uncertainty as to legal
jurisdiction over the reservations and dire need for further legisla-
tion. This suggests that the provisions of the Dawes Act, and the
surplus lands acts passed to implement it, did not, and were not
meant to, accomplish the extension of state law over the reserva-
tions. Further discussion must take into account the legal chaos
produced by the allotment process, the harsh effects of allotment
on the Indians, and the concomitant strengthening of the reserva-
tion system. Allotment, paradoxically, did not weaken the reser-
vation system, but necessitated its expansion.
In 1928 the Institute for Government Research presented an ex-
tensive study to Secretary of Interior Hubert Work, concluding
that the allotment process was a dismal failure.' 4 In this study,
known as the Meriam Report, the Institute stated that a "serious
153. Id. at 19, 25-26.
154. INST. FOR GOV'T RESEARCH, THE PROBLEMS OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1927)




impediment to the Indians' social and economic development"
was "the confusion that exists as to legal jurisdiction over the
restricted Indians in such important matters as crimes and misde-
meanors and domestic relations." '55 Further, the Report stated
that:
In some instances the state courts, in order to provide some
semblance of law and order, have enforced their authority on
reservations without legal warrant, but eventually the jurisdic-
tional question has been raised by attorneys appearing in
behalf of Indian clients, and thereafter such courts have
declined to take cognizance of the cases. 56
In other instances, states did not exercise jurisdiction (whether
they had the legal power to do so or not) because Indians did not
pay taxes and because Indians were considered the "exclusive
problem of the national government.""' Even in the late twen-
ties, forty years after the passage of the Dawes Act, the allotment
process had not accomplished the extension of state law over the
reservations.
The ambiguity in the Dawes Act as to when state law should
apply had not been clarified by any amending or supplemental
legislation passed after 1887. Indeed, much legislation only ex-
acerbated the confusion. The Burke Act, passed in 1906, altered
section 6 of the Dawes Act so that citizenship and amenability to
local law would be entirely within the discretion of the Interior
Secretary.' No longer did the 25-year period apply; the
Secretary could delay issuing the patent in fee until the Indian
was "competent." Since few Indians were "competent," the
Burke Act further slowed the allotment process. It also con-
tributed to the confusion as to legal relations on allotted reserva-
tions. As the report of the Executive Committee of the Indian
Rights Association noted in 1912:
Incongruous conditions have arisen by operation of the Act of
May 8, 1906. Perhaps 100,000 allottees had become citizens
and were subject to state laws prior to May 8, 1906. A like
number may have been allotted since that date who are refused
155. Id. at 16.
156. Id. at 768.
157. Id. at 768-69.
158. Act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 325, 327 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 391
(1982)).
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rights of citizenship and are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States.
An example of the anomalous situations brought about by
the amended act is presented within the Pine Ridge and
Rosebud Reservations, South Dakota, where almost 5000 allot-
tees are citizens of the State of South Dakota, and more than
that number are under the exclusive jurisdiction of United
States' laws. The application of the laws in the family relation
is unprecedented, and if not so serious would be ludicrous in
the extreme.
The more rigid the subjection to the law, the greater the
wrong in having the husband or wife amenable to the State,
while the remaining members of the family remain subject ex-
clusively to Federal Statutes. 15 9
The uncertain legal situation was worsened also by acts pro-
viding for leasing and the sale of the surplus lands because both
of these types of legislation brought land speculators and settlers
on the reservations.' 60 The aim of whites was often not only to
take land and other property legally, but also to take it illegally
from the Indians. Moreover, whites frequently employed state
courts and officials to accomplish their ends. This caused
confrontations with the Indian agents and police. The picture
sketched by historians and Indian agents of the period of 1890 to
1930 is one of constant tension between state and federal officials
over jurisdiction over the reservations, the tension generally aris-
ing from illegal activity by whites.' 6 '
Partially in response to attempts to exploit the Indians and
challenge federal jurisdiction, the federal Indian Service
expanded.' 62 The allotment process itself, however, also caused
159. EXEC. COMM. OF THE INDIAN RIGHTS ASS'N, 30th ANNUAL REPORT 62 (1912) (em-
phasis in original).
160. See Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 383, 26 Stat. 794 (leasing). Examples of later
mineral and surface leasing statutes include 25 U.S.C. §§ 394, 396, 398, 399, 403 & 415
(1982). See surplus lands acts cited supra note 2.
161. Otis discusses the harmful effects of leasing. See OTIS, supra note 94, at 99-131,
150. Otis describes an incident on the Winnebago and Omaha reservations. Land com-
panies and speculators moved onto the reservations and sought to lease illegally. This led
to a confrontation between the federal agent, who called in fifty extra police supplied by
the federal government and armed with seventy rifles, and state deputies and white
tenants who had a state court injunction. See also JOHNSTON, supra note 131, at 76-84.
162. See generally L. SCHMECKEBIER, THE OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (1927). See also
F. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 143 (Strickland et al. eds. 1982), which




increased federal activity. As Senator Teller had predicted, the
allotment of lands to the Indians caused their loss to whites.
Leasing also had this effect.'63 Moreover, those Indians who took
allotments were unprepared (financially and otherwise) to farm
them. Many allotments were too small and too infertile to sup-
port farming or grazing.'64 The overall result of allotment was
thus the dispossession and impoverishment of Indians and their
increased dependence on the federal government.'
61
This increased dependence contributed to the expansion of the
reservation system. For example, in the period 1890 to 1900,
when the need for the federal reservation infrastructure was ex-
pected to vanish, the number of agencies increased from fifty-
eight to sixty-one. 66 Government requisitions increased each year
of allotment,' 67 when they should have decreased. Schmeckebier
gives a detailed picture of the medical, agricultural, educational,
forestry, land, and administrative work done by the federal agen-
cies on the federal reservations in the 1920s.' 6s He also notes that
federal supervision and benefits extended to virtually all Indians
on opened and closed parts of the reservation because of the in-
heritance of restricted lands by citizen Indians.' 9 In the end, the
allotment process did not dismantle the reservation system; it only
provided reasons for its expansion.
The strengthening of the reservation system and the reassertion
of federal administrative power, in the face of the failure of allot-
ment, argues against the idea that the Dawes Act or the surplus
lands acts caused, or were meant to cause, the termination of the
reservations. Indeed, the reservation system, the agencies and
Indian police, were instrumental not only in protecting the
allotment period (e.g., government control over the Indians' capacity to make contracts,
even with their attorneys). In the 1942 edition of Cohen's Handbook, for example, the
observation is made about one appropriations bill that it enhanced federal control, intro-
ducing "an element of administrative discretion and flexibility into a system which when
originally proposed had been considered a means of releasing the Indian from dependence
upon administrative authorities," F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 80 (1942).
163. OTIS, supra note 94, at 150.
164. For example, see H.R. Doc. No. 191, 54th Cong., 1st Sess. (1896).
165. This is the conclusion of Otis, supra note 94, and the writers of the Meriam
Report, supra note 154.
166. OTIS, supra note 94, at 88.
167. Id. at 101. The Meriam Report also reports increased costs of administering
allotment. See supra note 154, at 461.
168. SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 162, at 289-90.
169. Id. at 286-87.
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Indians, but in imposing (often in vain) the allotment system on
the Indians. The failure of allotment to improve the Indians' con-
dition and make the reservations unnecessary led to an explicit re-
jection of the allotment policy in the early 1930s.
The history of allotment policy cannot end with its failure.
Rather, and especially for the purposes of interpreting the surplus
lands acts, this history must include its rejection. In the early
1900s, and especially in the 1920s with the writing of the Meriam
Report, Congress and the public at large became increasingly
aware that the prophecy of Senator Teller had come to pass.
Allotment had pauperized and dispossessed the Indians. In the
late 1920s and early 1930s, Congress and the federal government
reconsidered the policy, and in the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934 (IRA) explicitly rejected it. 170
The reversal of the allotment policy came, however, before the
allotment process had been completed. A large number of In-
dians still resisted allotment. Many who had taken allotments
after 1906 were still "incompetent." Many who had received
patents in fee had inherited restricted land, and so were still effec-
tively under the control of the reservation superintendent., The
reservation system and federal jurisdiction had not yet been
abolished, and the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act
ended at last the uncertainty as to when, or whether, that would
happen. It reaffirmed the reservation system.
The confusion as to legal jurisdiction over allotted reservations
was addressed not only by the Indian Reorganization Act, 7 2 but
by a later federal statute defining "Indian country."'' 73 As the
Supreme Court stated in Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes,74 "Congress by its more modern legislation has evinced a
clear intent to eschew any such 'checkerboard' approach within
our existing reservations, and our cases have followed Congress's
lead in this area.""' The policy of the IRA and later federal
statutes was to reaffirm the jurisdictional integrity of the reserva-
tions and their boundaries.
170. 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1982).
171. See SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 162 and accompanying text. See also JOHNSTON,
supra note 131 and accompanying text.
172. 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1982).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (1964).
174. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).




The Allotment Policy and the Reservation System
Historical analysis suggests, then, that Congress' failure to
mention whether the surplus lands retained reservation status did
not simply reflect a failure to consider or conceive that the opened
lands should remain a part of the reservations. Congress had re-
jected at least one allotment bill that provided for the abolition of
reservation lines and allotment. It also resisted a number of bills
and petitions, about the time it embarked on the allotment
policy, calling for reduction or termination of reservations. On a
few occasions (recall the Ponca and Otoe and Missouria reserva-
tions), Congress expressly altered reservation lines.
These points, along with other aspects of the legislative history
discussed above, suggest that in enacting the Dawes Act, Con-
gress had undertaken a radical experiment. It did not simply
abolish reservations, as it had done so often in the past. Rather,
it provided for a very gradual process of assimilation, the first
stage of which was the taking of allotments by tribal members
across the reservations, in the unopened and later the opened
areas. Then, whites were to take up lands and it was hoped that
their presence would encourage Indian assimilation. The reserva-
tion system, with the federal agencies, the military, the Indian
police, and the government lawyers, remained to implement the
allotment system and assist the allottees. Their support services
and jurisdiction extended across entire reservations.
Uncertainty existed as to whether state law extended over the
Indians in both the allotted and the unallotted lands. This uncer-
tainty, however, was largely the result of efforts (generally
resisted by federal officials) by white settlers and state officials to
exert state jurisdiction to deprive the Indians of their lands. Legal
scholars recognized that in the period of transition, until Con-
gress passed legislation extending state law over the reservations
or appending the reservations to adjacent counties, the Indians
were, under the terms of the Dawes and other allotment acts,
subject only to their own law and federal law.
The Supreme Court, in its recent opinion in Solem v. Bartlett,
has suggested that the distinction as to whether the opened lands
remained within the reservation, and subject to federal jurisdic-
tion, was "unimportant" to persons concerned with Indian af-
fairs at the time the various allotment bills were considered in
Congress. '76 The foregoing analysis would suggest, to the con-
176. 104 S.Ct. at 1165. See also text accompanying note 62 supra.
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trary, that the distinction was very important and that the allot-
ment policy represented a radical shift in Indian policy in which
the reservation system was left intact while the system of land-
holding was changed. Again and again, congressmen, federal of-
ficials, and legal scholars stressed that the allotment process was
to be gradual. This meant that they recognized that the "civiliz-
ing" effects of allotment were bound to be slow and that the
reservation system should not be dismantled until there was no
longer any need for it. That point, however, was never reached and
under the allotment process the reservation system was only
strengthened.
III. An Alternate Critique of Statutory Construction
of the Surplus Lands Acts
In light of the history of the allotment policy, the absence of
language in the Dawes Act and the surplus lands acts abolishing
the reservations and their boundaries is not so puzzling. Congress
intended the allotment legislation to cause primarily a land trans-
action, which, over the course of time, it was hoped would
"civilize" the Indian peoples. The reservations were left intact,
possibly for reasons of parliamentary strategy, more likely to aid
the implementation of allotment, to provide a back-up system in
case allotment failed or the Indians rebelled, and, perhaps also,
to protect the Indians from settlers and state authorities. During
the debate on the Dawes Act, remarks made that the allotment
system would be implemented gradually and that future con-
gresses should handle future exigencies, suggest that formal aboli-
tion of reservation boundaries and federal jurisdiction was ex-
pected to occur much later, through an explicit terminating
statute, when the Indians were "civilized."
The final stage of allotment, the ending of the reservations,
however, was never reached. The Indian Reorganization Act ex-
pressly repudiated the allotment policy in 1934. Moreover, in the
years since the passage of the surplus lands acts, the values of
American society have changed dramatically. Courts dealing with
the question of the boundaries of western Indian reservations,
however, still rely on the construction of statutes which, in terms
of Indian policy, are anachronistic.
Why, then, do courts continue to take the safe course of
statutory construction, tacitly assuming the validity of the surplus
lands acts? The answer lies in a general policy of the courts to




affairs."' Because the Constitution expressly grants Congress the
power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes'78 and to
regulate and dispose of the public lands, 79 it is argued, Congress
has virtually absolute power to control Indian affairs. Courts will
almost always dismiss challenges to the constitutionality of
federal statutes dealing with Indians and Indian reservations on
the grounds that they are not justiciable.
That the courts exercise great deference, especially with legisla-
tion affecting groups of people who are as economically and
politically disadvantaged as the Indian peoples,' 80 is disturbing.
Moreover, it causes one to suggest that the focus of legal inquiry
concerning the surplus lands acts should shift from a relatively
superficial inquiry into the language and history of the acts, to a
deeper constitutional inquiry into the validity of the acts for
determining legal relationships today.
Several considerations might lead to, or even compel, inquiry
into the constitutionality of the surplus lands acts, and the
strength of the plenary power doctrine. First, it is useful to review
what the surplus lands act did. The laws singled out particular
Indian tribes, confiscated their means of survival, and sought to
transform radically their living arrangements in order to destroy
their culture and "civilize" them. Further, a dominant force
behind the acts was the desire of settlers and speculators to obtain
the surplus lands from the Indians. The Indian tribes were
relatively weak and defenseless (as the courts so often recognize);
they had no realistic opportunity to protect themselves through
the political process. Although the surplus lands acts often
followed negotiations with the tribes, and were ostensibly
ratifications of agreements to cede lands, in practice few tribal
members acquiesced, and the statutes were generally unilateral
acts of Congress. The decision in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock
eliminated any need for Indian participation in the allotment
legislation.' 8' Finally, whatever compensation came to the In-
177. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955); Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). The courts have also described Indian affairs as a
"political question." See Lone Wolf, supra.
178. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3.
179. Id. art. I, § 3.
180. In other areas of law, for example, equal protection analysis, the Court has ac-
corded a "more searching inquiry" to statutes affecting those "discrete and insular
minorities" who are disadvantaged in the political process. United States v. Carolene
Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
181. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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dians for their lands was generally nominal and rarely went to the
Indians themselves. 82 Thus, unlike many treaties between the
United States and the Indian tribes, which respected tribal
sovereignty and were the product of consent, the surplus lands
acts were in substance, if not in form, unilateral legislative
deprivations directed against readily identifiable and politically
disadvantaged groups. Seen in this light, the surplus lands acts
have the unmistaken hue of bills of attainder." 3
If the surplus lands acts can be characterized as bills of at-
tainer, then the courts' assumption that they are constitutional on
grounds of the plenary power doctrine is not entirely accurate.
The bill of attainder clause is a textual restriction on Congress,
and it should be read with, and to limit, other sections of the
Constitution, including those relating to the Indian tribes and the
public lands. The Bill of Rights, incidentally, and in particular
the clauses guaranteeing freedom of expression and association, 4
should also be read to restrict grants of power to Congress. The
notion that Congress has "plenary" or "absolute" power in the
area of Indian affairs is doubtful in light of the fundamental no-
tions of limited government and the separation of powers that
underlie the bill of attainder clause and the Bill of Rights.' 5
A further constitutional consideration is that of the limits to
which an unconstitutional policy can be used by courts to inter-
pret statutes or the Constitution itself. In the case of Brown v.
Board of Education,8 6 for example, the Court at last dispensed
with historical construction of the fourteenth amendment and
reexamined it in light of changed values. 8 7 In Loving v.
Virginia,' another case stemming from a concerted attack on
the separate but equal doctrine, this time in the area of statutes
banning interracial marriage, the Court struck down as un-
182. Under the Dawes Act and many of the surplus lands acts the sale proceeds went
to a trust fund held by the U.S. Treasury Dep't for the Indians. This trust fund was in
turn subject to appropriation by Congress for the education and civilization of the In-
dians. See 24 Stat. 390, § 5 (1887); Act of May 29, 1908, 35 Stat. 460, 463, § 6.
183. See U.S. CONT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. For a general discussion of the bill of attainder
clause, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 484-95 (1978 ed.) and cases cited
therein.
184. U.S. CONT. amend. I.
185. See generally TRIBE, supra note 183.
186. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
187. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 862 (5th ed. 1976).




constitutional a Virginia statute "designed to maintain white
Supremacy." 18 9 These are examples of limitations on judicial
deference to the substance of legislative policy, and these limita-
tions have been well defined in the area of black/white race rela-
tions. A similar definition is needed in the area of Indian affairs.
This is especially so with respect to the surplus lands acts, which
were passed as a result of an allotment policy reflecting outdated
assumptions that Indian peoples were uncivilized and inferior.
This analysis suggests that a new inquiry is needed, one that
will go beyond statutory construction of the surplus lands acts to
the more difficult question of whether Congress overstepped the
bounds of its authority in enacting them. Such an inquiry should
be the start of a reconstruction of the law affecting the western
Indian reservations. It should have as its next step a search for
the treaties 90 and common law principles,' 9' which might provide
a sounder basis for determining the relationships between the
Indian tribes, the states, and the federal government.
189. Id. at 11.
190. For example, the Treaty of June 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, and the Act of Mar. 2,
1889, 25 Stat. 888, ratifying an agreement with the Sioux of the Dakotas.
191. Such as those developed by the Marshall Court, deriving the relation between the
United States and the Indian nations from the political process of treaty-making and re-
cognizing Indian nations as self-governing political communities not subject to state juris-
diction. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Peters) 515 (1832).
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